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ABSTRACT 
 
 Providing a suitable key agreement protocol for session initiation protocol is 
crucial to protecting the communication among the users over the open channel. This 
paper presents an efficient and flexible password authenticated key agreement 
protocol for session initiation protocol associated with Voice over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP). The proposed protocol has many unique properties, such as session key 
agreement, mutual authentication, password updating function and the server not 
  
needing to maintain a password or verification table etc. In addition, our protocol is 
secure against the replay attack, the impersonation attack, the stolen-verifier attack, 
the man-in-middle attack, the Denning-Sacco attack, and the offline dictionary attack 
with or without the smart card.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Recent advances in Internet technology have enabled the development of Voice 
over Internet Protocol (VoIP). Compared with traditional Public Switched Telephone 
Networks (PSTNs), VoIP has many attractive merits such as low cost devices, 
deployment, operation, and maintenance etc. So VoIP is receiving much attention and 
becomes a strong competitor to traditional PSTNs. The designers of the VoIP 
communication systems mainly focus on a good level of quality of service (QoS) and 
do not pay enough attention on security problems. In a VoIP call, the voice packets 
are delivered and exposed to the unsecured public Internet. Therefore, VoIP calls are 
more likely to be threatened by attacks than conventional telephone calls. If VoIP tend 
to dominate the voice call market, a comparable level of QoS and network security 
should be provided.  
Among many protocols used to handle sessions for VoIP, the Session Initial 
Protocol (SIP) is the widely used one, and the security of SIP is becoming 
increasingly important. The session initiation protocol was proposed for Internet 
Protocol (IP) based telephony by Internet Engineering Task Force Network Working 
Group [1]. SIP is an application layer control protocol for creating, modifying, and 
  
terminating multimedia sessions between participants [1]. As a request-response 
protocol, SIP authentication is inherited from HTTP Digest authentication, which 
makes it vulnerable to several types of security threats and attacks such as 
impersonation, eavesdropping, and message modification etc. An authentication key 
agreement is one of the most crucial technologies for achieving acceptable security 
level when SIP is used to protect the communications among the users. 
Confidentiality and authentication are two fundamental security services requirements 
for SIP.  Therefore, mutual authentication and key agreement should be provided for 
secure communication between the users. Mutual authentication is needed in SIP 
connections to ensure that the call is establishing only between the legitimate users. 
To achieve secure communication, the shared session key generated through the key 
agreement process is used to encrypt/decrypt the voice packets so that only the 
intended recipient can decrypt and retrieve the valid messages.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related work. 
Some preliminaries are reviewed in Section 3. Section 4 presents our authenticated key 
agreement protocol. In Section 5, the security of our proposed protocol is discussed. 
The performance of the protocol is discussed in Section 6, and the paper is concluded 
in Section 7. 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
The original authentication protocol for SIP was based on hyper text transport 
protocol digest authentication [2], which was not strong enough for providing 
acceptable security level in practice. In 2005, Yang et al. (2005) [3] argued that the 
original SIP authentication protocol was vulnerable to the off-line password guessing 
attack and the server-spoofing attack. To strengthen the security, they proposed a 
  
secure SIP authentication scheme based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange [4], in 
which security depended on the difficulty of Discrete Logarithm Problem. However, in 
the next year, Huang et al. [5] demonstrated that Yang et al.’s scheme could not resist 
off-line password-guessing attack and involved expensive exponential computation, so 
it was not suitable for devices with a low computational power. And then they 
proposed an efficient authentication scheme for session initiation protocol.  Later on, 
Jo et al. [6] pointed out that both the Yang et al.’s and Huang et al.’s authentication 
schemes were not secure against to the off-line password guessing attack. Following 
Yang et al.’s work, Durlanik et al. (2005) [7] suggested an efficient SIP authentication 
scheme by using Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in 2005. Compared with Yang et 
al.’s scheme, Durlanik et al.’s scheme reduced the total execution time and memory 
requirements; as the scheme was based on the elliptic curve cryptosystem, it could 
offer equivalent security as classical cryptosystems for much smaller key sizes. In 
2009, Wu et al. (2009) [8] proposed an SIP authentication scheme based on ECC that 
provides provable security in the Canetti-Krawczyk security model [9]. They claimed 
that their scheme was secure against replay attacks, off-line password guessing attacks, 
man-in-the-middle attacks, and server spoofing attacks. Wu et al.’s scheme assumed 
that the communicating parties have shared a common secret beforehand between the 
IM Services Identity Module (ISIM) and the Authentication Center (AC). Although, 
compared with previous schemes, this pre-shared key scheme was more efficient and 
practice, the problem of distributing the shared secrets made this solution hard to scale.  
In 2010, Yoon et al.(2010) [10]  indicated that both Durlanik et al.’s and Wu et al.’s 
SIP authentication schemes were vulnerable to off-line password guessing attacks, 
Denning-Sacco attacks, and Stolen-verifier attacks. To improve security, they proposed 
an efficient authentication scheme for SIP based on ECC. However, Pu [11] and 
  
Gokhroo et al. [12] argued that Yoon et al.’s scheme still suffered from both off-line 
password guessing attacks and replay attacks. 
 Nonce based SIP authentication scheme was proposed by Tsai et al. [13] in 2009. In 
this scheme, only one-way hash function and exclusive-or operations were used for 
mutual authentication and key agreement, so it reduced the computation costs. 
However, in [14], Yoon et al. showed that Tsai’s scheme could not resist off-line 
password guessing attacks, Denning-Sacco attacks, and stolen-verifier attacks, and the 
scheme did not provide perfect forward secrecy. To overcome these weaknesses, Yoon 
et al. proposed a new scheme which not only could resist these attacks but also 
provided perfect forward secrecy. Later, Xie et al. [15] claimed that the Yoon et al.’s 
scheme was still vulnerable to stolen-verifier attacks and off-line password guessing 
attacks. Arshad et al. [16] also demonstrated that Tsai’s scheme was vulnerable to off-
line password guessing attacks and stolen verifier attacks. In addition, they found that 
Tsai’s scheme did not provide known-key secrecy and perfect forward secrecy either. 
To improve the scheme, they proposed a revised authentication scheme based on ECC. 
Unfortunately, He et al. [17] argued that the Arshad et al.’s scheme still suffered from 
the off-line password-guessing attacks.  
In most of the protocols mentioned above, the SIP server needs to store a password 
or verification table containing the passwords or the hashed passwords of all registered 
users for verification purposes, thereby making those schemes suffer from some 
attacks such as password guessing attacks, stolen-verifier attacks and server-spoofing 
attacks. In addition, since the password or verification tables are usually very large, 
maintaining the tables makes these solutions hard to scale up, and the reset password 
problem decreases its applicability for practical use. 
  
In this paper, we propose an efficient and flexible password authenticated key 
agreement for session initiation by means of a smart card. The main merits of the 
proposed protocol include: (1) it does not maintain any password or verification table 
in the SIP server; (2) users can choose or change its own password freely; (3) both the 
user and the server can authenticate each other; (4) the user and the server can agree a 
session key; (5) it is secure against the replay attack, the impersonation attack, the 
stolen-verifier attack, the man-in-middle attack, and the Denning-Sacco attack; (6) 
even if the smart card was stolen, it still could resist the offline dictionary attack. 
 
3. PRELIMINARIES 
In this section, we introduce the basic concepts of the elliptic curve cryptosystem 
and the corresponding difficult problems associated with it. In an elliptic curve 
cryptosystem, the elliptic curve equation is defined as the form of 
2 3( , ) : (mod )pE a b y x ax b p   over a prime finite field pF , 
where , pa b F and 3 24 27 0(mod )a b p  . Given an integer *pt F and a point ( , )pP E a b , 
the scalar multiplication tP over ( , )pE a b can be computed as follows: ...tP P P P    (t 
times). 
Definition 1. Given two points P and Q over ( , )pE a b , the elliptic curve discrete 
logarithm problem (ECDLP) is to find an integer *pt F such that Q tP .  
Definition 2. Given three points P , sP and tP over ( , )pE a b for *, ps t F , the 
computational Diffie-Hellman  problem (CDHP) is to find the point stP over ( , )pE a b .  
Definition 3. Given two points P and Q sP tP  over ( , )pE a b for *, ps t F , the elliptic 
curve factorization problem (ECFP) is to find two points sP and tP over ( , )pE a b .  
  
We assume that the three problems above are intractable. That is, there is no 
polynomial time algorithm that can solve these problems with non-negligible 
probability. 
 
4. OUR PROPOSED SCHEME 
In this section we describe our Authenticated Key Agreement (AKA) protocol. In 
our protocol, there are two entities, the user’s smart card and the server. The proposed 
protocol consists of four phases: system setup phase, registration phase, authentication 
phase, and password changing phase. The procedure of the protocol is described in 
details as follows: 
 
4.1. System setup phase 
 
Step 1:S The server chooses an elliptic curve equation ( , )pE a b with the order n , which 
is defined in Section 3.  
Step 2 :S The server selects a base point P with the order n over ( , )pE a b , where n is a 
large number of the security considerations. Then, the server chooses a 
random integer *R ps Z as a secret key and computes the public key pubP sP .  
Step 3 :S The server chooses three secure one-way hash functions *( ) :{0,1} {0,1}kh   , 
* *
1( ) : {0,1} {0,1} {0,1}
kh G    , and * *2 ( ) : {0,1} {0,1} {0,1}kh G G     , where G is a 
cyclic  addition group that is generated by P over ( , )pE a b .   
Step 4 :S The server keeps s  secret and publishes the public information 
1 2{ ( , ), , , ( ), ( ), ( )}p pubE a b P P h h h   . 
 
  
4.2. Registration phase 
 
When userU  wants to register with the server, it performs the following steps with 
the server. 
Step 1:R The server verifies user U through a secure identification protocol. If U is 
eligible, then U chooses its password PW and a random integer *R pa Z . Next, 
U computes ( )h PW a  and then sends{ ( ), }h PW a username to the server over a 
secure channel. 
: ( ( ), )U S h PW a username  
Step 2 :R After the server receives the information from U  , it computes secret 
information 1( ( ) )R h h PW a username s P . 
Step 3 :R The server stores R in the memory of a smart card and delivers this smart 
card to U in a secure channel. Then the user keeps PW and the smart card 
secretly for registration processes. 
Step  4 :R After receiving the smart card, userU will store a in the smart card. Then 
the memory of the smart card contains ( , )R a . 
For each user, the registration phase performs once.  
 
4.3. Authentication phase 
 
When user U wishes to login to the server, it must inserts its smart card to a card 
reader and inputs its username and password PW . Then the smart card and the server 
cooperate to perform the following steps as shown in Fig1. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1. Authenticated key agreement phase 
 
 
Step 1:A  User U chooses a random integer *R pb Z , and 
computes ( )V bR h username P  and ( ( ) ) pubW bh h PW a username P  . Next it 
sends a request message ( ,REQUEST username  , )V W to the server over a public 
channel. 
: ( , , )U S REQUEST username V W  
Step  2 :A After receiving the request message, the server 
computes ( )X h username P and ' 2 ( )W s V X  . It then verifies whether the 
following equation holds
?
'W W . If the equation holds, it chooses two 
random integers *R pc Z and *R pr Z , 
computes S cP , ( ) ( ( ) )K cs V X cbh h PW a username P   , 
2. ( )X h username P   
 3. ( ( ) )K bh h PW a username S , 1( )SK h K r username   
 
?
2 ( ( ( ) ) )s pubAuth h K h h PW a username bP r SK  
   If the equation holds, 1( ( ( ) ) 1 )u pubAuth h K h h PW a username bP r SK   
1. *R pb Z , ( )V bR h username P  , ( ( ) ) pubW bh h PW a username P  
( , , )REQUEST username V W  
( , )uRESPONSE realm Auth  
Server 
( )s  
User U  
( , , ( , ))Username PW Smartcard R a  
' 2 ( )W s V X  , ? 'W W  
If the equation holds, *R pc Z , *R pr Z  
1( )SK h K r username  
'
2 ( )sAuth h K W r SK  
( , , , )sCHALLENGE realm Auth S r  
4. Check ? '
2 ( 1 )uAuth h K W r SK   
  S cP , ( )K cs V X   
  
1( )SK h K r username  and '2 ( )sAuth h K W r SK . Then it sends 
( , , , )sCHALLENGE realm Auth S r to user U over a public channel.  
: ( , , , )sS U CHALLENGE realm Auth S r  
Step 3 :A Upon receiving the challenge message, U computes 
( ( ) )K bh h PW a username S   ( ( ) )bch h PW a username P and 1( )SK h K r username . 
Then it verifies whether the following equation 
holds
?
2 ( ( ( ) ) )s pubAuth h K h h PW a username bP r SK . If the equation holds, it 
computes 2 ( ( ( ) ) 1 )u pubAuth h K h h PW a username bP r SK  and sends 
( , )uRESPONSE realm Auth to the server over a public channel. Otherwise, it 
deletes the received information and the protocol stops. 
: ( , )uU S RESPONSE realm Auth  
Step  4 :A After receiving the response message, the server verifies 
if
?
'
2 ( 1 )uAuth h K W r SK  . If the message is authenticated, the server sets 
SK as the shared session key with userU ; otherwise, it deletes the receiving 
information and the protocol stops.  
 
4.4. Password changing phase 
 
When the userU wants to update its password, it needs to agree on a session key 
SK with the server via the authentication phase in advance. Figure 2 illustrates how 
the password changing phase works. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                Fig.2. Password changing phase 
 
 
Step 1:P The userU chooses its new password *PW and a random integer * *R pa Z . It 
then uses the session key SK to encrypt the new password 
message **( , ( ))username h PW a . Next it transmits username, 
* * * *( ( ) ( ( )))SKE username N h PW a h username N h PW a  and N to the server, 
where N  is a nonce for freshness checking. 
* * * *: ( , ( ( ) ( ( ))), )SKU S username E username N h PW a h username N h PW a N  
Step 2 :P Upon receiving the information, the server decrypts the message and then 
checks the validity of the authentication tag * *( ( ))h username N h PW a . If it is 
valid, the server computes the new secret 
information * * * 1( ( ) )R h h PW a username s P . It then sends encryption 
information  * *( ( 1 ))SKE R h username N R  to the userU . 
* *: ( ( ( 1 )))SKS U E R h username N R   
2. Decrypt the message and determine whether 
* *( ( ))h username N h PW a is valid.   
 3. Decrypt the message and decide whether  
*( 1 )h username N R is valid.  
 If so, store * *( , )R a in the smart card. 
1. *PW , * *R pa Z , *R pN Z  
* * * *( , ( ( ) ( ( ))), )SKusername E username N h PW a h username N h PW a N  
Server 
( )SK  
User U  
( , )Username SK  
If so, compute * * * 1( ( ) )R h h PW a username s P  
* *( ( ( 1 )))SKE R h username N R  
Compute * * * *( ( ) ( ( )))SKE username N h PW a h username N h PW a  
and * *( ( 1 ))SKE R h username N R
  
 Step 3 :P  The userU decrypts the received message and checks the validity of the 
authentication tag *( 1 )h username N R . If it is valid, the userU stores * *( , )R a  
in its smart card. 
 
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
In this section, we discuss the security of our proposed protocol by analyzing some 
possible attacks, then evaluating the security of the protocol.  
 
5.1. Replay attacks 
A replay attack is an offensive action in which an adversary impersonates or 
deceives another legitimate participant through the reuse of information obtained in a 
protocol. The following explains why the proposed protocol can resist replay attacks. 
Suppose an adversary Alice intercepts the user 'U s request message 
( , , )REQUEST username V W  and replays it to the server to impersonate the user U . 
However, Alice cannot construct a valid ( )V bR h username P   without the knowledge 
of the secret key s . When Alice tries to guess the secret key s  from V orW , she will 
face the ECDLP. Then the server will find the attack by checking whether 
' 2 ( )W s V X  and W  are equal.  
On the other hand, suppose Alice intercepts ( , , , )sCHALLENGE realm Auth S r from the 
server and replays it to impersonate the server. In order to pass the verification 
process of the userU , Alice needs to compute a valid sAuth . When Alice tries to guess 
the correct password PW , the nonce a  and the random number b from V or W to 
construct a valid sAuth , she not only has to face the ECDLP but also needs to break the 
  
hash functions. If Alice cannot construct a valid sAuth , the userU will find out that 
sAuth is not equivalent to its computed 2 ( ( ( ) ) )pubh K h h PW a username bP r SK . Then, the 
userU will stop the protocol and not send ( , )uRESPONSE realm Auth  back to Alice. 
Suppose that an adversary Alice impersonates U  and replays the 'U s RESPONSE  
message ( , )uRESPONSE realm Auth . For the same reason, if Alice cannot compute a 
valid uAuth , the server will find out that uAuth is not equivalent to its 
computed '2 ( 1 )h K W r SK  . Then the server will delete SK  and stop the protocol. 
Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist the replay attacks. 
 
5.2. Man-in-the-middle attacks 
 
The man-in-the-middle attack is a form of active eavesdropping in which the 
attacker makes independent connections with the victims and relays messages 
between them, making the victims believe that they are talking directly to each other 
over a private connection, where in fact the entire conversation is controlled by the 
attacker. 
Analysis shows the proposed protocol can resist the man-in-middle attacks. In the 
proposed protocol, the user U and the server share a session key SK only after mutual 
authentication between the user U and the server. So, an adversary Alice cannot 
impersonate the userU  to establish a session key with the server unless she can pass 
the verification process of the server. If Alice tries to pass the verification, she has to 
face the ECDLP. On the other hand, for the same reason Alice cannot impersonate the 
server to share a session key with the userU . In addition, Alice neither can get the 
session key between the userU and the server nor can intrude into the communication 
  
between the userU and the server to intercept the exchanged data and inject false 
information. Thus, Alice cannot launch the man-in-middle attack to cheat either the 
userU  or the server. 
 
5.3. Modification attacks 
 
A modification attack is an attempt by an adversary to modify information in an 
unauthorized manner. 
Assuming that an adversary Alice intends to impersonate the user U  by sending 
(REQUEST  ' ', , )username V W  to the server, ' ',V W  are constructed by Alice. The server 
will find the attack by checking whether ' 2 ( )W s V X  and W  are equal, because Alice 
does not know the secret key s .  
If an adversary Alice tries to impersonate the server and sends 
' ' '( , , , )sCHALLENGE realm Auth c P r  to the user U , where ' ',c r are chosen by Alice and 
'
sAuth is constructed by Alice. But the CHALLENGE message cannot go through the 
verification process of the userU as the password PW , nonce a and random number 
b are not known. 
Supposing that an adversary Alice wishes to impersonate the user U  and sends 
'( , )uRESPONSE realm Auth  to the server, where 'uAuth is computed by Alice. However, the 
server will find the modification by checking
?
'
2 ( 1 )uAuth h K W r SK  . Therefore, the 
proposed protocol can resist the modification attacks. 
 
5.4. Denning-Sacco attacks 
 
  
The Denning-Sacco attack occurs when an attacker compromises an old session key 
and tries to find a long-term private key (e.g., user password or server private key) or 
other session keys. 
In the proposed protocol, the session key 
is 1 1( ) ( ( ( ) )SK h K r username h cbh h PW a username P   )r username . Supposing an 
adversary Alice obtains the session key SK . Alice cannot obtain the 'U s  password 
from SK and other intercepted messages, because Alice not only has to face the 
ECDLP but also needs to break the hash functions. Therefore, the proposed protocol 
can resist Denning-Sacco attacks. 
 
5.5. Stolen-verifier attacks 
 
The stolen-verifier attack means an adversary who steals the password-verifier 
from the server can use it directly to masquerade as a legitimate user in a user 
authentication process. 
For example, if an adversary wants to get the valuable information through stolen 
the verification table stored in the server, she or he cannot implement the stolen-
verifier attack successfully, since no password or verification table stored in the server 
database. So the protocol can resist the stolen-verifier attacks. 
 
5.6. Offline dictionary attacks without the smart card 
 
The offline dictionary attack without the smart card is defined as the process in 
which attackers attempt to determine whether each of their guessed passwords is 
correct or not via the intercepted messages transmitted between the user and the server. 
  
Assuming that an adversary Alice intends to carry out the offline dictionary attack, 
she obtains the REQUEST message ( , , )REQUEST username V W through eavesdropping the 
communication between the user U  and the server. To obtain the PW , Alice needs to 
extract ( ( ) )h h PW a username  from ( )V bR h username P  or ( ( ) ) pubW bh h PW a username P , 
which is equivalent to solving an instance of elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. 
So it is unlikely for Alice to do the offline dictionary attack by using the 
REQUEST message. Additionally, the adversary Alice cannot derive PW  from the 
information sAuth or uAuth , because the entropy of ,K ,a r and SK are all very large. 
Therefore, the offline dictionary attacks without the smart card is invalid in the 
proposed protocol. 
 
5.7. Offline dictionary attacks with the smart card 
 
The offline dictionary attack with the smart card is defined as the process in which 
attackers attempt to determine whether each of their guessed passwords is correct or 
not via the information stored in the smart card of the user and the intercepted 
messages transmitted between the user and the server. 
Assuming that an adversary Alice obtains the secret information ( , )R a stored in the 
smart card of the user U  and intercepts the REQUEST  message, 
the CHALLENGE message and RESPONSE  message transmitted between the userU and 
the server. Compared with the offline dictionary attack without the smart card, the 
addition information known by Alice in this attack is ( , )R a . However, Alice cannot 
extract ( ( ) )h h PW a username  from R and then check whether each of their guessed 
passwords is correct or not via ( ( ) )h h PW a username . Because computing 
  
( ( ) )h h PW a username  from R is equivalent to solving an instance of elliptic curve 
discrete logarithm problem. Furthermore, for the same reason, Alice cannot obtain 
( ( ) )h h PW a username from uAuth  and sAuth . Therefore, the offline dictionary attack with 
the smart card also is invalid in the proposed protocol. 
 
5.8. Session key security 
 
Session key security means that at the end of the key exchange, the session key is 
not known by anyone but only the two communicating parties. 
In the proposed protocol, the session key 
1 1( ) ( ( ( )SK h K r username h cbh h PW a username   ) )P r username  is not known by anyone 
but only the user U and the server since ( ( ) )K cbh h PW a username P  cannot be 
constructed correctly by the adversary Alice without the knowledge of 
( , , )b a PW or ( , )s c . None of this session key 1( )SK h K r username  is known to anybody 
but the userU and the server. Therefore, the proposed protocol provides session key 
security. 
 
5.9. Known-key security 
 
Known-key security means that each run of an authentication and key agreement 
protocol between two communicating parties should produce unique secret keys 
(session keys). 
In the proposed protocol, the server and the userU  randomly and independently 
generate the random number c and b separately, the session 
  
key 1( ( ( ) ) )SK h cbh h PW a username P r username of each session is not connected with 
the session keys of any other sessions. Knowing a session key 
1( ( ( ) ) )SK h cbh h PW a username P r username and the random values c and b is not 
enough for computing the other session keys 
' ' ' '
1 ( ( ( ) ) )SK h c b h h PW a username P r username , because in each session a fresh session 
key is generated depending on ' ' ( ( ) )c b h h PW a username P , and this secret differs in 
every session. Therefore, the proposed protocol provides the known-key security. 
 
5.10. Perfect forward secrecy 
 
Perfect forward secrecy means that if long-term private keys of one or more entities 
are compromised, the secrecy of previous session keys established by honest entities 
is not affected. 
  In the proposed protocol, suppose that the user’s password PW and the server’s 
secret key s are compromised. The adversary Alice cannot obtain the session 
key SK for the past sessions.  Because Alice still faces the ECDLP to compute 
the 1( ( ( ) ) )SK h cbh h PW a username P r username  when she tries to extract the 
value c from S cP . Therefore, the proposed protocol satisfies the property of perfect 
forward secrecy.   
                                                   
5.11. Mutual authentication 
 
Mutual authentication means that both the user U and the server are authenticated 
with each other within the same protocol. 
  
In the proposed protocol, the server and the user can authenticate each other by 
checking uAuth  and sAuth , respectively. Therefore, the proposed protocol can provide 
mutual authentication. 
 
5.12. Security chosen and update password 
 
In the proposed protocol, the legitimate user with the smart card can freely choose 
her or his favorite password in the registration phase. It will make users easy to 
remember their own passwords. The proposed protocol also provides an update 
password phase for users to change their password freely. Any other person, even 
having stolen or lost the smart card, cannot change or update the password without 
knowing the current session key SK sharing between the user U and the server.      
 
6. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS 
 
In this section, we summarize the functionality of the proposed protocol and 
compare the proposed protocol with Xie et al.’s protocol. In Xie et al.’s protocol, the 
server needs to store a password table of all registered users for verification. In the 
proposed protocol, the password is embedded in ( )h PW a . After receiving 
{ ( ), }h PW a username  in the registration phase, the server computes 
1( ( ) )R h h PW a username s P  and stores it in the memory of a smart card, and then 
delivers the smart card to the user U via a secure channel. During the registration 
process, the server does not need to store a password table. In addition, the proposed 
protocol provides a securely update password phase for users to change their 
password freely and can resist stolen smart card attacks. As shown in Table 1, the 
  
proposed protocol can provide more unique properties such as no password or verifier 
table and password update freely, which were not considered in Xie et al.’s protocol. 
These new features are very important in implementing a practical and universal 
authenticated key agreement for session initiation protocol. 
As the protocol of Xie et al. is currently the most secure and efficient one in the 
literatures, we compare the proposed protocol and Xie et al.’s protocol in terms of 
computational costs. First, we define some notations as follows. 
(1) ecsmT  the time for executing a scalar multiplication operation of elliptic curve. 
(2) ecpaT  the time for executing a point addition operation of elliptic curve. 
(3) hT  the time for executing a one-way hash function. 
 (4) invT  the time for executing a modular inversion operation. 
(5) skeT  the time for executing a symmetric key encryption operation. 
(6) skdT  the time for executing a symmetric key decryption operation. 
In the registration phase, the proposed protocol requires one hash operation on the 
user side, one scalar multiplication of elliptic curve and one modular inversion 
operation on the server side.  In the authentication phase, the user takes four scalar 
multiplication operations to compute , ( ) , ( ( ) ) pubbR h username P bh h PW a username P and 
( ( ) )bh h PW a username S ; one point addition operation to obtain ( )V bR h username P  ; 
and six one-way hash function operations to compute 
( ), ( ), ( ( ) ), ,s uh username h PW a h h PW a username Auth Auth and SK . The server takes four 
scalar multiplication operations to get 2( ) , ( ),h username P s V X S and K ; one point 
addition operation to compute V X ; and three one-way hash function operations to 
obtain , sSK Auth and uAuth . In the password changing phase, the user takes three one-
way hash function operations to compute 
  
** * *( ), ( ( )h PW a h username N h PW a and *( 1 )h username N R  ; one symmetric key 
encryption operation and one symmetric key decryption operation. The server takes 
one scalar multiplication operation and one modular inversion operation to 
compute *R ; three one-way hash function operations to compute 
* * * *( ( )), ( ( ) )h username N h PW a h h PW a username  and *( 1 )h username N R ; and one 
symmetric key encryption operation and one symmetric key decryption operation. 
Table 2 shows that our protocol costs more computational overhead compared with 
Xie et al.’s protocol. This is because the proposed protocol does not maintain any 
password or verification table on the server and provide securely update password 
phase for users to change their password freely, which requires more operations to 
achieve the unique properties of the protocol and then resist all possible attacks of an 
authenticated key agreement protocol. For example, in our protocol, an adversary 
cannot carry out a stolen-verifier attack, since no password or verification table stored 
in the server. Therefore, this computational increase is indispensable for constructing 
a reliable and trustworthy authenticated key agreement for Session Initiation Protocol 
used by VoIP.  
 
7. CONCULSION 
 
This paper has proposed an efficient and flexible password authenticated key 
agreement protocol for SIP where the user and the server can achieve mutual 
authentication and key agreement by using password and the smart card. In 
comparison with other related protocols, the proposed protocol not only provides 
many unique characters, such as mutual authentication, session key agreement, 
  
password updating freely and the server not needing to maintain a password or 
verification table etc, but also can withstand the replay attack, the impersonation 
attack, the stolen-verifier attack, the man-in-middle attack, the Denning-Sacco attack, 
and the offline dictionary attack with or without the smart card. Especially, the 
proposed protocol does not require any password table for verification, which makes 
this solution easy to scale up and enhances its applicability for practical use.  
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Table 1. The functionality comparisons between our protocol and Xie et al.’s 
protocol 
 
N/A:  Not Applicable or Not Available 
 
 
Table 2. Computational comparisons between our protocol and Xie et al.’s 
protocol 
 
 
 
Registration phase 
Authentication phase  
Password change phase 
Xie et al.’s protocol Our protocol 
1 1 1ecsm h invT T T   
8 2 9ecsm ecpa hT T T 
2 2 6 1 1ske skd h ecsm invT T T T T   
1 skeT  
6 6 1 1 1 1ecsm h ske skd ecpa invT T T T T T    
No password or verifier table 
Password update function 
Secure mutual authentication 
Xie et al.’s protocol Our protocol 
No 
Secure to stolen smart cards  
Session key agreement  
Perfect forward secrecy  
Secure to Denning-Sacco attacks  
Secure to password guessing attacks  
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes 
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
N/A
Yes 
Yes
Yes 
